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NOTE
POWER TO DECLINE THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
The dual judicial system existing in the United States inherently causes friction where the federal and state courts meet in
the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, empowered
by the Constitution' with defining the extent of the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts, by the respective expansion and contrac3
2
tion of federal jurisdiction has regulated this friction. In certain
fields the federal judiciary, for various purposes, has contracted its
jurisdiction in favor of state courts; and pressure is being exerted
4
for further judicial limitation.

1. U. S. Const. Art. III, § 1.
2. See Frankfurter, Distribution of JItdicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L. Q. 499, 506-515 (1928).
3. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (Supp. 1952) which prohibits interference with state tax orders where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy
exists in the state courts; 28 U. S. C. § 1342 (Supp. 1952), which is similar
in that it prohibits interference with state public utility rate orders under
certain circumstances.
4. See Judge Clark's disapproval of this trend in P. Beiersdorf & Co.
v. McGohey, 187 F. 2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion). The
most recent recommendation concerning Congressional limitation of diversity

NOTE
I. STATE POLICY AND UNSETTLED STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS

A. JurisdictionBased on a Federal Question
Where a substantial federal question exists, federal jurisdiction
may be invoked originally5 or on removal.6 Where interpretation of
unsettled state law is necessary to ascertain the existence of a federal
question, federal courts can decide the state question although such
will be a final disposition of the case requiring no decision of the
federal question.7 The traditional reluctance to decide constitutional
issues if decisions can be predicated on other grounds8 frequently
prompts federal courts to make determinations of state law.
Nevertheless, there have evolved judicially-imposed restrictions
on federal question jurisdiction. When federal equity jurisdiction
is invoked, the federal court in the exercise of its equitable discretion
will withhold injunctive relief pending an authoritative state determination of a doubtful state question in "exceptional circumstances."' The circumstances which warrant withholding jurisdiction are generally limited to those exceptional instances where
federal intervention would infringe upon the rightful independence
of the state by prematurely interfering with domestic affairs,"1
jurisdiction urges that the jurisdictional amount be raised from $3,000 to
$7,500 and that a corporation be deemed a citizen both of the state of its
creation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. See
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States 1, 27 (1951).
5. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (Supp. 1952). Federal question jurisdiction may
be invoked to protect those rights arising under federal law, federal treaties,
or the Constitution. Ibid.
6. 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (Supp. 1952).
7. E.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175 (1909);
see City of Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., 251 U. S. 192

(1920).
8. See, e.g., Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450,
470-471 (1945) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (concurring opinion).
9. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175 (1909);
see EBillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946). But see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 76 (1937). However, a decision
based on federal construction of state law, while disposing of the case, is
only tentative and at best a prediction of the state law; the state court's
determination of its own law is controlling. See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U. S.
402, 413-414 (1952) (concurring opinion) ; Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Corp., supra at 74. And where a federal court had found that a state statute
violated the state constitution, the Supreme Court provided for dissolution
of that decree if the state court subsequently found the statute valid. See
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933) ; Note, 43 Yale L. J. 669
(1934).
10. E.g., A. F. of L v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946): Chicago v.
Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168 (1942) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496 (1941).
11. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 235-236 (1943)
(summarizing the "exceptional circumstances").
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especially state administrative action. 12
In diverting questions of state law to state courts the federal
action is usually stayed for a reasonable time to allow commencement of an independent state suit to obtain an authoritative decision
concerning the applicable state law.1 If determination of the state
question does not completely dispose of the controversy, the federal
court vacates the stay order and the action on the federal question
proceeds. If an action is already pending in a state court which will
determine the unsettled state question, a federal court is more inclined to grant a stay pending outcome of the state action than when
no state action has been instituted. 1 4 Submission of the state questions to the state court is expensive and inconvenient for the litigants, but the doctrine of equitable abstention is motivated by the
stronger considerations of harmonious cooperation between federal
and state governments.' 5
The rationale of the equitable abstention doctrine as it first appeared was to enable the federal courts to avoid (1) a premiature
constitutional decision' 6 and (2) needless friction with state courts
whose decision would supplant a federal ruling on the state question. 17 It was thought that application of the doctrine was limited
to cases in which the state decision could dispose of the entire case,",
making federal adjudication of the constitutional issues unnecessary.' This analysis was supported by the refusal to extend the
12. See Davis, Administrative Law § 218 (1951).
13. See, e.g., Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321 (1950) ; Spector Motor
Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). But see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S.
315 (1943) (complaint dismissed) ; Local 333B, United Marine Division v.
Battle, 101 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Va. 1951) (action dismissed because adequate
remedy available through state courts and direct appeal to Supreme Court).
The practice of submission of doubtful questions of state law to state courts
in any type of case has been criticized from a practical viewpoint. See Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J. 267, 293-294 (1946).
14. See Chicago v. Feldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168, 173 (1942).
15. Id. at 172-173.
16. See Spector Motors Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 104-105
(1944) ; Chicago v. Feldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168, 173 (1942) ; Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500-501 (1941).
17. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra note 16, at 499-500;
see Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 211 (1929)
semble-where the adequacy of the state remedy was mentioned and the
complexity of the contracts and statutes was stressed.
18. See Wendell, Relations Between the Federal and State Courts 59
(1949).
19. See Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 575, 582 (1948). Supreme Court dicta
also supported the same proposition. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. United
Gas Corp., 317 U. S. 456, 463 (1943) ; cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S.
472, 490 (1949).

NOTE

abstention doctrine to cases involving nonconstitutional federal
questions °- with the possible exception of federal bankruptcy proceedings'A recent application of the abstention doctrine in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry.22 indicates its extension,
since the Supreme Court, while carefully distinguishing the cases
in which jurisdiction has been withheld to avoid premature constitutional decision, stated that a federal district court in the exercise
of equitable discretion should not interfere with the regulatory
order of a state agency-although applicable state law was sufficiently definite to avoid objection to a federal decision as an unnecessary constitutional adjudication. The only stated limitation to
this broad policy of non-intervention occurs when it is shown
that state courts do not offer adequate protection of a federal
right. - While concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter, an
advocate of the original abstention doctrine, 24 attacked the decision
as a virtual abdication of the congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction-at least in the area of state regulatory proceedings
-since the extraordinary circumstances justifying application of
the abstention doctrine were absent in this case.2"
B. JurisdictionBased on Diversity of Citizenship
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, like federal question jurisdiction, may be invoked originally26 or on removal.2 7 Where diversity alone is the basis of jurisdiction, normally no constitutional
issue would be present and therefore none would be avoided by
submitting unsettled state questions for state court determination.
It is then compatible in the typical diversity case, where no constitutional issue exists, that the federal courts regard the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction to require adjudication of the
20. See Propper v. Clark, spra note 19, at 489-490 (Trading with the
Enemy Act) ; Estate of Spiegel v. CIR, 335 U. S. 701, 707-708 (1948), 33
Minn. L. Rev. 547 (1949) (includibility of trust corpus for federal estate
taN).
21. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
22. 341 U. S. 341 (1951).
23. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southery Ry., supra note 22, at 349.
24. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
(t October Term, 1928. 43 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 61-62 (1929). Frankfurter
wrote the majority opinions in the cases which announced the doctrine. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Railroad Comm'n v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940).
25. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S. 341, 351
11951) (concurring opinion).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1952).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1952).
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rights of the parties although state law may be novel or unsettled. -' While federal construction of state law does not control state
courts, 2 the decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 30 is interpreted as
imposing greater responsibility on federal courts in their application of state law.3
Nevertheless, the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is not completely unrestricted. Among the first limitations is the doctrine that
a federal district court has discretion to decline equitable jurisdiction where the suit concerns the administration of the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation ;32 but this "internal affairs rule" is limited
to situations in which the courts of the corporation's domiciliary
state can grant a more just and effective remedy. 33 While reference
is still made34 to the uniformly criticized 5 internal affairs rule, it
rarely has been used as a method of declining to hear the merits of a
controversy.3 6
28. E.g., Sutton v. Leib, 342 U. S. 402 (1952); Meredith v. Winter
Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943) ; see Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S.
123, 148 (1933) (dissenting opinion). But even where the exercise of
federal jurisdiction would not interfere with state domestic policy, Justice
Frankfurter, in order to avoid a tentative determination, would remand all
unsettled questions of state law for authoritative decision by the state courts.
See Sutton v. Leib, stipra at 412-414 (concurring opinion). See also Harlow
v. Ryland, 172 F. 2d 784, 786-787 (8th Cir. 1949), 50 Col. L. Rev. 710
(1950), where the court, although sitting in diversity in an action at law,
refused to declare a state statute invalid under the state constitution because
the state supreme court would have the final word anyway.

29. See note 9 supra.
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 22 Minn. L. Rev. 885.
31. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 237 (1943).
32. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123 (1933); ef. Koster
v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947); Williams
v. Green Bay & W. R. R., 326 U. S. 549 (1946).

33. See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., stupra note

32, 'passihm (application of forum non conveniens) ; Williams v. Green Bay &
W. R. R., supra note 32, at 554-556; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra
note 32, at 131.
34. See, e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stockholders v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
193 F. 2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
35. See Notes, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 192 (1934); 33 Col. L. Rev. 492
(1933) ; 31 Mich. L. Rev. 682 (1933).
36. See e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stockholders v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
193 F. 2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Note, 46 Col. L. Rev. 413, 420-421 (1946).
But see Healy v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 48 F.. Supp. 207 (M.D. N.C.
1942) (dismissal without prejudice where identical action already pending
in a state court of the corporation's domicile). Much of the internal affairs
rule apparently has been superseded by the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
with dismissal of any action when, all considerations weighed, the availability of a more appropriate forum is indicated; the doctrine's statutory
counterpart provides for change of venue under virtually the same circumstance. 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1952). While the internal affairs
rule in the Rogers case used substantially the same test as that of forum
non conveniens, consideration was limited to the adequacy of the remedy
afforded by the courts of the corporation's domiciliary state and not to
availability of .an adequate remedy in the courts of any other place. See
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 131 (1933).

NOTE

1952]

Independently of the internal affairs rule and for somewhat
different reasons, another limitation on diversity jurisdiction
evolved, providing that if all creditor and stockholder interests are
adequately protected, federal receivership actions being equitable
37
in nature should be declined in deference to expert state agencies.
The reluctance to -frustrate the function of a state agency which is
able to administer the receivership efficiently and more economically
than an inexpert federal court underlies the surrender of jurisdiction.-', But a sharp distinction must be drawn between declining
jurisdiction in favor of state administrative agencies as differentiated
from state courts, since jurisdiction is more freely surrendered to a
state agency." 9
It has been intimated that even in a diversity case a federal
court of equity would stay its proceedings in favor of a state forum
under the same exceptional circumstances which call for the application of the abstention doctrine in federal question cases. 40 Thus
in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 41 where equity jurisdiction rested both

on diversity of citizenship and presence of a federal question, the
Supreme Court declined to enjoin enforcement of an order of the
Texas Railroad Commission on the ground that the subject matter
was a complicated specialty for a particular state court which, acting
as an adjunct of the state administrative agency, reviewed the
Commission's orders. A vigorous dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter in which three justices concurred 42 criticized the majority's decision as an arbitrary judicial limitation of diversity
jurisdiction in contravention of Congress's deliberate refusal to
impose such restrictions. 43 The dissent does recognize, however,
that equity jurisdiction need not always be exercised where state
law is doubtful.

44

But again in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
k3Y.,"4 where, as in the Burford case, jurisdiction was predicated
on the dual bases, the Court, in declining to exercise its jurisdiction,
37. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935).
38. See Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30, 39 (1935) ; Pennsylvania
v. Williams, mupra note 37, at 182-183.
39. See id. at 183-184; Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 319 U. S. 315, 346 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).
40. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 234 (1943).
41. 319 U. S. 315 (1943).
42. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts and Reed joined Justice
Frankfurter in dissenting.
43. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336 (1943) (dissenting
opinion).
44. Id. at 345.
45. 341 U. S. 341 (1951).
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indicated that the result would not vary with the basis of jurisdiction. Avoidance of friction with domestic policies was stressed and
reliance was placed neither on the reluctance to decide constitutional issues nor on the presence of doubtful state law. Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson, while concurring in the result, ignored
the diversity aspect of jurisdiction and limited their attack on the
decision as a judicial abdication of federal question jurisdiction
to state courts.4 6
II.

FEDERAL DECLARATORY ACTION WHEN RELATED
STATE ACTION PENDING

Although it is not controverted that a federal court has the
power to hear and decide an in personam action although an
identical action is pending in a state court,47 whether a federal

court must exercise its jurisdiction in such a case is not entirely
certain.'8 Where, however, federal declaratory relief is sought in an
in personam action, the federal court unquestionably has discretion
to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.49 The different approach results from the nature of the declaratory judgment, which requires
as a sine qua non that a useful purpose be served by the granting
of a declaratory judgment.50 So when a state action is already pending at the time the federal declaratory action is commenced, the
federal court is required to ascertain the usefulness of the requested
declaratory relief.5 ' If the state action is at least as comprehensive
46. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S. 341 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
47. E.g., Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922) ; see
Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U. S. 47, 49 (1943) ; Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 466 (1939).
48. See P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Judge Clark dissenting) ; Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir.
1949) (Judge Frank dissenting).
49. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491 (1942); see 51 Yale
L. J. 511 (1942).
50. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Chicago, 186 F. 2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1951);
Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Gas Co., 177 F. 2d 942, 944 (6th
Cir. 1949) ; see Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions
for Declaratory Judgments, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 677, 678 (1942) ; cf. Carbide
& Carbon Corp. v. United States Chemicals, 140 F. 2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1944)
(concurrent federal actions). An action for declaratory relief is analogous
to an extraordinary equitable remedy because of its discretionary granting,
but a characterization as equitable fails since a declaratory judgment may
be granted although an adequate legal remedy exists. When a declaratory
action is refused to be heard because of the pendency of a related state
action, it is refused because it would serve no useful purpose and not because
of the adequacy of the legal remedy. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci,
123 F. 2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke,
89 F. 2d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1937).
51. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 495 (1942) ; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Kortz, 151 F. 2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1945). Where,

NOTE

as the federal action, the declaratory judgment generally would serve
no useful purpose, and the lower federal courts, mindful of the
5
Supreme Court's admonition to avoid "gratuitous interference"
53
with state courts, usually refuse declaratory relief.
The exercise of jurisdiction may also be refused where the
declaratory action is being used as a circumvention of or a substitute for the removal statute when the right to remove has been
lost by the failure to conform to the statutory requirements,5 4 when
the rights of the parties depend upon unsettled questions of state
law,' when it is used as an instrument of harassment, 58 or when
the declaratory judgment would prematurely interfere with state
administrative and fiscal policies.- In concurrent actions, the first
decision is res judicata to the common issues between the common parties in the other action,53 and declining jurisdiction not
only eliminates the race for res judicata, but also avoids expensive
and wasteful duplication of litigation and needless friction with
state courts.
The pendency of a prior state action, however, does not of
itself necessarily indicate that a federal court should refuse to grant
a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment could serve a
useful purpose and should be granted despite the prior state action
where the question to be determined in the federal court is not
present in the state action, 9 where the rights of more parties can
howevcr, the federal declaratory action precedes a related state action, the
federal courts do not relinquish jurisdiction, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,
108 F. 2d 824 (8th Cir. 1940); since the state proceedings cannot be enjoined the two actions proceed independently. Washington Loan & Trust
Co. v. Lyon, 98 F. Supp. 320 (D. D.C. 1951). But it has been indicated that
where there are related concurrent federal declaratory actions the question
of priority of commencement is not determinative, and the suit which will
more expeditiously adjudicate the rights of all the parties will be allowed
to continue while the other action is stayed. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v.
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180 (1952).
52. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 495 (1942).

53. See, e.g.. Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Oliver, 172 F. 2d 68 (8th

Cir. 1949) ; see Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Overcash, 133 F. 2d 228, 232
(8th Cir. 1942) ; Greer v. Scearce, 53 F. Supp. 807, 813 (W.D. Mo. 1944).
54. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F. 2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U. S. 905 (1952) ; see Kaufman & Ruderman v. Cohn & Rosenberger, 177 F. 2d 849, 850 (2d Cir. 1949).
55. See Yellow Cab Co.v. Chicago, 186 F. 2d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1951).
56. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Schriefer, 142 F. 2d 851, 853 (4th Cir.
1944) (by implication) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Boyle Construction Co., 123
F. 2d 558, 565-566 (4th Cir. 1941).
57. Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S.293 (1943).

58. Restatement, Judgments § 43 (1942).
59. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United Corp., 111 F. 2d 443 (1st Cir. 1940)

(alternative holding) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Finance Serv.,
101 F. 2d 514 (3d Cir. 1938).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:46

be determined in the federal suit," or possibly where the federal
action is likely to reach a faster determination than the state proceeding.61

The statutory 2 grant of power to issue declaratory judgments
does introduce the element of discretion in the assumption of jurisdiction; but it cannot accurately be said that the refusal to exercise
jurisdiction where such relief would serve no useful purpose is a
judicially created limitation of federal jurisdiction, 3 since the power
to decree a declaratory judgment under such circumstances theoretically does not exist. Moreover, the discretion is not uncontrolled
and improper refusal to exercise jurisdiction may be corrected on
64
appeal.

III.

FEDERAL NoN-DECLARATORY ACTION WHEN RELATED
STATE ACTION PENDING

A. Where State In Rem or QuasiIn Rein Action Pending
A long established judge-made limitation on federal jurisdiction
applies to the situations where the nature of the relief sought in
parallel state and federal actions requires that each court take
possession or control of the same property-the res 65 -either initially66 or during the progress of the litigation.6 7 The court which first
secures possession or control of the res takes jurisdiction to the
60. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 495 (1942). The

liberal federal rules of joinder may allow more parties and issues to be
joined in a single action, thus avoiding piecemeal litigation condemned in
American Automobile Ins. Co v. Freundt, 103 F. 2d 613, 619 (7th Cir.
1939) and in Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. 2d 321, 325 (4th
Cir. 1937). See, generally, Wright, Joinder of Clahins and Parties Under
Modern Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580 (1952).
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 provides that an action for a declaratory judgment may be advanced on the calendar.
62. 48 Stat. 955 (1934), now 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202 (Supp. 1952).

63. Judge Clark lists as one of the inroads on federal jurisdiction the
refusal to grant declaratory relief when a pending state jury action seeks
affirmative relief against the federal suitor. See P. Beiersdorf v. McGohey,
187 F. 2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
64. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 299, 313 (2d ed. 1941).
65. The res rule was first clearly announced in Freeman v. Howe, 24
How. 450 (U.S. 1860). Prior thereto the federal judges expressed regret at
being unable to avoid the unseemly conflict occasioned by simultaneous proceedings but regarded the conflict as inherent within the dual judicial system.
See Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 Fed. Cas. 1319, No. 17,031 (C.C. Me. 1838).
66. Where the property has been reduced to the possession or control
of one court, the action, for purposes of this doctrine, is said to be a pro-

ceeding in rem. See Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F. 2d
772, 778 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 620 (1932).

67. Where possession or control of the property has not been attained but
must necessarily be gained in order to give effect to the court's judgment,
the action is then said to be a proceeding quasi in rem. Actions quasi in rem

include suits to foreclose mortgages, to enforce specific liens, to marshal assets,
to administer trusts, and to liquidate estates. Ibid.

NOTE

exclusion of the other court. Constructive possession of the res
is deemed to be acquired by the court in which the action is first
commenced 3 provided the actions involve substantially the same
parties and have the same purpose.s
Where, however, the simultaneous actions do not involve
substantially the same parties or purposes, but do require that
possession or control of a specific res be taken by the court, existence of jurisdiction to dispose of the res turns on priority in attaining actual possession or control of the property instead of on
priority in the institution of proceedings.70 Until the res is reduced to the actual possession or control of one court, neither
72
7
action can be enjoined ' and both proceed concurrently.
The res rule is used to avoid actual physical conflict between
the federal and state judicial systems. 73 As a corollary, both actions
may proceed simultaneously when one action would not interfere
with the other court's possession of the property, as in proceedings
68. This assumes that process issues properly. See Palmer v. Texas,
212 U. S. 118, 129 (1909); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street
Elevated R. R., 177 U. S. 51, 61 (1900).
69. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43 (1928). However, the
courts have encountered no little difficulty in determining what constitutes
sufficient similarity of issues and parties. Early cases required virtual
identity of issues, but some relaxation of the rigorous rule has been indicated.
Compare Ingram v. Jones, 47 F. 2d 135 (10th Cir. 1931), with Maxwell Co.
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 48 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
70. United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463
(1936) ; see Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43 (1928) ; Leggett v. Green,
188 F. 2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1951).
71. The court which first acquires actual or constructive control or
possession of the res may enjoin other proceedings which would interfere
with its custody. See, e.g., Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456
(state injunction of federal proceedings) ; see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Lake Street Elevated R. R., 177 U. S. 51, 61-62 (1900) (state court unable
to enjoin federal court plaintiff from proceeding where federal court had
possession first) ; cf. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 134136 (1941), 26 Minn. L. Rev. 558 (1942). The Toucey decision revitalized the
federal statute that prohibited federal courts from enjoining state proceedings.
Exceptions had developed to the statute, among them being the res cases.
See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
in State Courts, 42 Yale L. J. 1169, 1177 (1933). Tourey denied the validity
of all these exceptions save the res cases. Its effect has been offset by enactment of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (Supp. 1952) which is believed to revive
the exceptions that had existed prior to the Toucey case. See Moore, Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code 395-396 (1949).
72. E.g., Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1894); United States v.
Kensington Shipyard & Drydock Corp., 169 F. 2d 9 (3d Cir. 1948);
Boynton v. Mfoffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F. 2d 772 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U. S. 620 (1932) ; see Penn Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S.
189, 196 (1935).
73. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 135 (1941);
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 235 (1922).
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to determine rights in the property held by the other court 4 or
75
rights against persons with respect to the property.
Unlike most judge-made inroads on federal jurisdiction, refusal to pass on the merits in the rem and quasi in rem cases is
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter rather than a
discretionary disinclination to exercise existing jurisdiction.76 Further, since state courts have the power to enjoin federal proceedings which would interfere with the state court's prior acquisition
of the res, 77 it is essential that refusal to adjudicate the claims be
predicated on a non-discretionary basis.
B. Where State in Personam Action Pending
In both the state 78 and federal courts 79 the rule is well estab-

lished that the pendency of a prior in personam action between the.
same parties on the same claim in another jurisdiction is not
grounds for dismissal of an action subsequently commenced.90
74. Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490 (1946) (federal action to determine right of Alien Property Custodian to share in a decedent's estate being
probated in a state court); United States v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276 (1938)
(state action to declare escheat of moneys deposited in a federal court
registry); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936)
(federal action by receiver to determine his rights to funds administered by
a successor trustee appointed by a state court).
75. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33
(1909) (federal action to determine parties' respective rights in an estate
being administered in a state probate court) ; see McClellan v. Carland,
217 U. S. 268 (1910) (federal action by in heir against an administrator
when state court action was to be commenced to determine an escheat of the
estate) ; see Rosenberg v. Baum, 153 F. 2d 10, 13 (10th Cir. 1946) (federal
action to impose constructive trusts upon real estate being probated in a
state court). The judgment of the court which does not have possession of the
res may be given effect by being set up in the court which has control of the
property.
76. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 467-468 (1939).
But cf. Metropolitan Finance Corp. v. Wood, 175 F. 2d 209 (9th Cir. 1949).
Seizure of property in the possession or control of another court is a nullity.
Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583 (U.S. 1857).
77. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456 (1939) ; Note.
90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 714, 721 (1942).
78. E.g., Greenberg v. Greenberg, 11 N. J. Super. 582, 78 A. 2d 723
(1951) (alternative holding) ; Perkins v. DeWitt, 197 Misc. 369, 94 N. Y. S.
2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 752 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1952); Mills v. Howard, 228 S. W. 2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
79. Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U. S. 47 (1943) ; see Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 230 (1922) ; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 174 F. 2d 89, 100 (10th Cir. 1949), rc'd on other grounds.
339 U. S.667 (1950).
80. Although the pendency of a prior suit may become involved in
many types of situations, the following 3 appear to be the most common:
(1) Where the same plaintiff sues the same defendant on the same
claim in a different jurisdiction.
(2) Where the defendant in the prior action sues the prior plaintiff on
a claim arising out of the same occurrence.

NOTE

State courts generally exercise their discretion to avoid the duplication of litigation by staying their proceedings pending termination of prior state" or federal litigation. 2 Similarly, federal courts
have discretion to stay their proceedings when an action which
will decide the principal issue of the subsequent action is pending
in another federal court, even though the parties to the actions
are not the same."J
Even at an early date, however, considerable uncertainty prevailed concerning the power of a federal court to grant a stay in
deference to a prior substantially similar in personam action in a
state court .1 In the federal courts the pendency of an action in a
state court customarily was raised by a plea in abatement which results in dismissal without prejudice as a matter of right if the plea is
successful ;85 such pendency was but infrequently raised by a motion
to stay" which is directed to the court's discretion S7 The decisions
Where the plaintiff seeks to abate the defendant's counter-claim on
the ground that it is the basis of a prior action by the defendant.
See generally, Comment, 39 Yale L. J. 1196 (1930).
81. E.g., Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 214 P. 2d
844 (2d Dist. 1950) ; Greenberg v. Greenberg, 11 N. J. Super. 582, 78 A. 2d
723 (1951).
82. E.g., Lanova Corp. v. Atlas Engine Co., 44 Del. 593, 64 A. 2d
419 (Super. Ct. 1949) ; ef. Mennonna v. Pennsylvania R. R., 5 N. J. Misc.
233, 136 Atl. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 274 N. W. 411
(1937) (subsequent state action must be stayed unless only the state proceedings can protect a substantial right).
83. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936).
84. See Loring v. Marsh, 15 Fed. Cas. 898, No. 8,514 (C.C. Mass.
1864), aff'd, 6 Wall. 337 (U.S. 1867) (concluding that a stay could not be
granted). But see Brooks v. Mills County, 4 Fed. Cas. 290, No. 1,955 (C.C.
Iowa 1876) (concluding that a plea in abatement is good if the state and
federal courts have the same geographical jurisdiction).
85. See Shipman, Common-Law Pleading 388 et seq. (3d ed., Ballantine,
1923).
86. See Comment, 39 Yale L. J., 1196, 1198 (1930).
87. A discretionary stay of proceedings in an action at law is, however, markedly distinct from an equity court's discretionary power to decline
to exercise jurisdiction. Although Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure abolishes the procedural distinctions between actions at law and
suits in equity, the power of a federal court to exercise discretion in the
dispensation of equitable relief remains inviolate. See, e.g., A. F. of L. v.
Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 593, 599 (1946). Substantive equity principles
remain unchanged. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S.
368, 382 n. 26 (1949). Prior to the fusion of law and equity, federal equity courts occasionally declined to hear a case when a related
action was already pending in a state court. The reasons were two: (1) that
since the matter could be adjudicated satisfactorily in a state court, there
was no showing of irreparable damage warranting extraordinary equitable
relief, Atlas Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563 (1939) ; (2) that
the action could have been removed to a federal court and therefore an
adequate legal remedy existed in the federal court. Cable v. United States
Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288 (1903). The adequacy of the available legal remedy
is the remedy afforded by the federal courts and not the state courts.
See Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64, 69 (1935).
(3)
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of the Supreme Court are authority only for the propostion that a
pending state action is not grounds for dismissal of a federal
action.8" And apparently no Supreme Court decision unequivocally
holds that a federal court is without the discretionary power to stay
its proceedings because a prior in personam action is pending in a
state court involving substantially the same parties and issues. But
at the court of appeals level, strong Supreme Court dicta which
is addressed to the inability to "abdicate jurisdiction" to state courts
by sustaining a plea in abatement has been used as authority for
refusing to grant a discretionary stay of federal proceedings." The
lower federal courts, then, have developed the doctrine that an
absolute right to a federal forum exists. Notwithstanding the widespread prevalence of the "absolute right" theory, the possible existence of discretion in granting a stay of federal proceedings has been
alluded to.90
Although some federal district courts had disregarded the
arbitrary "no stay" rule in actions at law,91 not until two recent
decisions from the Second Circuit has it been seriously considered
that the mere pendency of a prior state in personam action may be
sufficient reason to stay a federal suit involving substantially the
same parties and issues. In the earlier decision, Mottolese v.
Kaufman,92 the court, while noting the inroads already carved out
of federal jurisdiction 2 and the presence of a multiplicity of suits,9
relied principally on the considerations of fairness and convenience
88. Nevertheless, these cases are generally relied upon in refusing to
grant a stay of the federal action: Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260
U. S. 226 (1922) ; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910) ; Chicot County
v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529 (1893) ; Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 168 (1878) ;
Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876) ; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170 (U.S.
1857).
89. See, e.g., Great North Woods Club v. Raymond, 54 F. 2d 1017 (6th
Cir. 1931) ; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Quinby. 137 Fed. 882 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 198 U. S. 585 (1905). The doctrine was applied also in the district courts. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 260 (W.D.
La. 1924) ; Woren v. Witherbee, Sherman & Co., 240 Fed. 1013 (N.D. N.Y.
1917).
90. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Randolph, 72 F. 2d 892, 894 (4th Cir. 1934);

Boston Mines Corp. v. Salina Coal Co., 3 F. 2d 729, 735 (8th Cir. 1925);
Ironton v. Harrison Construction Co., 212 Fed. 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1914);

Hinsdale Paper Co. v. Norfolk Paper Co., 101 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D. Mass.
1951).

91. E.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 89 F.
Supp. 167 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Zimmerer, 66 F. Supp.

492 (D. Neb. 1946) ; Auditorium Conditioning Corp. v. Carrier Corp., 54 F.
Supp. 99 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) ; cf. Vanderwater v. City Nat. Bank, 28 F. Supp.
89 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (although an action in equity, stay was predicated on
the comity owed the state).
92. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).

93. Id. at 302-303. The court mentioned the practice of staying a federal
action awaiting state construction of its statutes or constitution, the internal

19521

NO TE

underlying forum non conveniens to uphold the discretionary
power to grant a stay of the federal action. " 5 No abuse of discretion was found since the record did not indicate that the federal
action would be tried earlier than the state action ;9 and by conditioning the stay on the defendant's submission to discovery under
the federal rules, plaintiff's chief procedural advantage obtained by
bringing a federal suit was protected. The latter condition may be
objectionable because, by implementing with federal practices the
discovery methods available for state litigation, it usurps the power
of the state to fi its own court procedure. And it may encourage
institution of dual actions in order to gain advantage of the federal
discovery devicesY The established federal practice of granting
stays in deference to a related prior federal action s illustrates,
however, the flexibility of the conditional stay as a tool to impel
sensible and economical litigation.9
The obvious effects of the ilottolese case in eliminating parallel
proceedings are the conservation of judicial time and energy, the
protection of defendants from procedural harassment, and the
affairs rule, declining receivership actions in deference to state administrative agencies, and the declaratory judgment situation.
94. Id. at 303. The multiplicity of suits doctrine is not strictly applicable
since equity jurisdiction is assumed-not declined-to prevent multiplicity.
See I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 243 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
95. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949):
.for we can see no difference in kind between the inconveniences which
may arise from compelling a defendant to stand trial at a distance from the
place where the transactions have occurred, and compelling him to defend
another action on the same claim." Since the 3Mottolese case was a shareholders' derivative action which is equitable in nature, see Koster v. (American) Lumbermens 'Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947), the court
seemingly could have invoked its equitable discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction. But this aspect of the case was ignored, and in P. Beiersdorf &
Co. v. McGohey, 187 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951), where only a legal remedy
was sought, the llottolese case was regarded as controlling.
96. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the federal non-jury
docket was 11 months behind, but the comparative congestion of the state
court was not mentioned.
97. Formerly, if a duplicate federal action was instituted only to obtain
advantage of federal discovery practice, no utilization of the discovery
device- was allowed. See De Seversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F. R. D.
183, 185 (E.D. N.Y. 1941) ; Empire Liquor Corp. v. Gibson Distilling Co.,
2 F. R. D. 247, 248 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
98. See text to note 83 supra.
99. See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc.,
89 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (stayed unless plaintiff agreed to cease
the state proceedings); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Knitting 'Machines Corp., 90
F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1950) (second of two federal actions stayed on condition that defendant waive any claim for damages accruing during the duration of the stay) ; Schwartz v. Kaufman, 46 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. N.Y. 1940)
(stayed with leave to vacate stay order if another federal action which was
more comprehensive was unreasonably delayed).
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elimination of wasteful duplication of effort. Viewed in the light
of these advantages, the result of the Mottolese case is, of course,
compelling. A plaintiff in the state court should not be allowed to
refute his original choice of forum and bring to bear the additional costs of preparation of identical law suits, which could force
the defendant into an unjust settlement. Similarly, a state court
defendant who has had an equal opportunity to sue in a forum
of his own choice or a claim arising out of the same occurrence
should not be able to hamper the plaintiff's litigation in his chosen
forum. 00 Nor should the courts of either system be burdened with
superfluous hearings. 01'
A subsequent federal action properly may be brought, however,
with the intention of gaining certain advantages available in a
federal court-such as more liberal rules of evidence,' 0 - broader
discovery procedure, and possibly a more understanding judge, a
better jury, and a speedier trial.'0 3 The Mottolese decision implicitly
recognizes that these advantages may be sufficient to justify simultaneous proceedings but asserts that the federal suitor must show
that the advantages outweigh the reasons for granting a stay.
Judge Frank in his dissenting opinion indicates that he, on the
other hand, would place the burden on the defendant to show why
the stay should be granted. 0 4 He has support from two analogous
situations: on a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens the movant has the burden of showing that there is a
more appropriate forum ;105 and where a similar action is pending

in another federal court which .may decide the principle issue, the
party requesting the stay has the burden of showing its utility. 100
Despite this there may be validity in placing the burden on the
100. If defendant has lost his right to remove, allowing defendant's subsequent federal action to proceed would condone circumvention of the removal statute. See note 54 supra.

101. Since the first action to reach judgment might be res judicata to

the pending action, see Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 22-6, 230

(19222), the proceedings which have transpired before entry of the plea of res
judicata are wasted.
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) provides that, of three available rules, the
federal courts use that one which most favors admissibility.
103. For example, the calendar of the Minneapolis federal district
court is current (communication from the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, on file, University of Minnesota
Law Library), while the corresponding (Hennepin County) calendar of
the state district court is 15 months in arrears (communication from the
clerk of Minnesota District Court, Fourth Judicial District, on file, University of Minnesota Law Library).
104. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1949).
105. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508 (1947).
106. See Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 255-256 (1936).

1952]

NOTE

plaintiff since bad identical actions been brought in courts of the
same jurisdiction, the second action07would be regarded as vexatious
and would be abated summarily.
Inasmuch as the cases which intoned the "absolute right"
theory relied only on questionable precedent and did not meet the
practical objections to simultaneous actions, consideration should
be given the objections to discretionarily granting stays which
are raised by Judge Clark in his dissent to P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey,0 s the decision relying on the Mottolese case. The procedure used in the Mottolese case requires that at the hearing on the
motion to stay the federal action it be ascertained whether the
advantages made available by institution of the federal action outweigh the disadvantages'"' of dual state and federal proceedings. If
the stay is granted, the order granting it is reviewable on petition
for mandamus to the court of appeals;'o however, an order denying
the stay is not appealable" and probably is not reviewable on
petition for mandamus." 2
It is to this procedure that Judge Clark raises four objections.
The first is that the hearing on the motion to stay is a waste of
time for the court and counsel. But it seems at least as wasteful to
proceed with a full-scale trial irrespective of its utility or necessityonly to have the issues mooted by entry of judgment in the state
action."'
107. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588, 592-593
1878) ; Seeger v. Young, 127 Minn. 416, 419-420, 149 N. W. 735, 736 (1914).
108. 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
109. Consideration should be given such factors as the scope of the
issues of the respective actions, similarity of parties, comparative congestion
of the courts' calendars, and the adequacy of the relief available in each
court. In denying a motion to stay, a recent decision relied in part upon the
fact that the attorneys in the state and federal actions were not the same.
See Montro Corp. v. Prindle, 105 F. Supp. 460, 465, 466 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
110. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) (Supp. 1952) a court of appeals may
issue writs in the nature of mandamus in aid of its potential jurisdiction. See
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U. S. 21, 25 (1943). Failure to adjudicate the merits of matters properly presented to the district court justifies
issuance of the writ. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910) ; P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301 (1949). Contra: Jewell v. Davies, 192 F. 2d 670 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 904 (1952).
111. It is not a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C.
§ 1291 (Supp. 1952). Cf. Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229 (1945) ; In re
Kilpatrick, 167 F. 2d 471 (5th Cir. 1948). These cases state that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable.
112. That mandamus will not lie to review an order denying motion to
dismiss, see Sound Inv. & Realty Co. v. Harper, 178 F. 2d 274 (8th Cir.
1949) ; cf. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F. 2d 731 (8th
Cir. 1945). But cf. Whittel v. Roche, 88 F. 2d 366 (9th Cir. 1937) (mandamus will lie to review order denying motion to dismiss).
113. It is true, however, that if the federal suit had not come up for
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The second bbjection is the difficulty of determing whether the
state action will afford as complete relief. But an analysis of the
respective pleadings would usually determine the general nature
of the relief sought, and the fact that the federal remedy is more
adequate is a factor which favors allowing the federal action to
proceed. Furthermore, if the state suit does not settle all issues,
the stay order may be vacated and trial proceed on the issues not
rendered res judicata by the state adjudication.
judge Clark's third objection is to the appropriateness of penalizing diligence in commencing the federal action. But if the plaintiff in state court subsequently commences a similar federal action,
staying his federal suit does not unduly penalize his diligence since
it was utilized initially to institute the state action. Where a state
court defendant with equal opportunity to institute action is the
federal suitor, allowing the federal action to proceed would in effect
penalize the state court plaintiff's diligence in commencing action.
especially where the expenses of the additional litigation would force
the state plaintiff to abandon his state action.
Fourthly, judge Clark finds it difficult to imagine that objective
bases can be found on which to premise refusal to exercise jurisdiction. This is probably his most telling criticism, since if no criteria
exist to test the exercise of discretion, the district judge has power
to arbitrarily choose the cases which he will hear if a related
state action is pending. The Mottolese and Beiersdorf cases have
produced few guides to aid in determining what facts are to be considered in ruling on the stay. Mottolese mentioned only the
broader discovery devices of the federal court and the delay concomitant with a federal trial, but failed to compare the relative
delay in the state court. Limiting analysis to only these aspects
is not an accurate appraisal of the advantages of the federal action
and necessarily vests the district judge with almost uncontrolled
discretion.

IV. CONCLUSION
The working area of federal jurisdiction has undergone recurring diminution for varied and independent reasons. Reluctance
to make tentative constitutional decisions114 and the desire to avoid
interference with domestic policy until it has had an opportunity to
trial before the state judgment was entered, no federal judicial effort would
have been expended; under the Mottolese procedure the motion on the stay
may have been heard before entry of the state judgment and the time spent
hearing the motion wasted.
114. See note 16 supra.

NOTE

be reviewed in the state courts"15 underlies the surrender of jurisdiction in some cases. The inability to afford as convenient and effective relief as a state agency 1 6 or another court" 7 also contributes
to the contraction of federal jurisdiction. Another limitation is
based on the necessity of avoiding physical conflict between the two
judicial systems over control of specific property." s All these
limitations have been considered by the Supreme Court and now
are firmly established-though sometimes over the criticism that
self-imposed restrictions upon jurisdiction are judicial legislation."1 Nevertheless, in at least two situations the limitations announced by the Court have been sanctioned subsequently by Con20
gress and enacted into law.
Originally the refusal to entertain a controversy was limited
to cases in which equitable relief was requested; however, the introduction of federal forum non conveniens extended the right
to refuse jurisdiction in cases which sought only a legal remedy. It
was, then, the establishment of forum non conveniens which paved
the way for a general discretionary power to refuse to hear a caseregardless of the relief sought. And as indicated by Judge Frank,
since the limitation of jurisdiction promulgated in the Mottolese
case fits into none of the established exceptions, allowing a federal
court sitting in diversity to decline to exercise jurisdiction under
the circumstances existing therein destroys by judicial decision a
substantial area of diversity jurisdiction. 21'
Yet diversity jurisdiction has been undermined not only by express judicial and congressional limitations but also by development of the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins; 2 2 and the futility
115. See text to notes 22-25 supra.
116. See text to notes 37-39 supra.
117. See text to notes 32-33 supra.
118. See text to note 67 supra.
119. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S.
341, 357-362 (1951) (concurring opinion) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 515, 517 (1947) (dissenting opinion) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U. S. 315, 344-345 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
120. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), by enactment of
28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) (Supp. 1952) (which predicates change of venue upon
essentially the same considerations upon which dismissal is based in forum
non conveniens) ; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932), by enactment of 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (Supp. 1952) (proscription against interference
with state tax orders).
121. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1949)
(dissenting opinion).
122. 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 22Mvfinn. L. Rev. 885. Since a federal court whose
jurisdiction is based on diversity is "in effect, only another court of the
State," see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108 (1945), 30 Minn.
L. Rev. 643 (1946), the possibility is recognized that the federal court must
stay its proceedings in deference to a prior state action if the state court would
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and undesirability of diversity jurisdiction is repeatedly urged.128
Nevertheless, Congress, although the probable historical bases for diversity jurisdiction have largely disappeared, 124 steadfastly has declined to abolish it. Hence, the Mottolese and Beiersdorf cases are
peculiarly vulnerable to the criticism that they are judicial legislation.
As a practical matter, however, the approach adopted appears desirable. But to guard against arbitrary "abdication of jurisdiction,"
criteria similar to those used to test the utility of a declaratory action
should be developed to guide the exercise of discretion in staying a
federal suit.125
do likewise in a similar situation. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kellas, 80 F.
Supp. 497, 501 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 120 (lst Cir. 1949). But a
federal court is foreclosed from hearing a case, under the Erie doctrine, only
if a court of the state in which it is sitting is without jurisdiction to hear a
similar case. Cf. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535 (1949);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947). And since granting stays rests
in the court's discretion and is not premised on want of jurisdiction, it would
appear that a federal court is not bound to follow the state rule on granting
stays under the doctrine of Angel v. Bullington. See 32 Minn. L. Rev. 633
(1948) (concluding that forum non conveniens should be procedural rather
than substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine).
123. See Wendell, Relations Between the Federal and State Courts,
248 et seq. (1949) ; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 19 A. B. A. J. 499 (1933); Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L. Q.
499, 520-530 (1928) ; Weschler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of

the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 234 (1948) ; Comment, 31

Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1932) (reviewing proposed legislation designed to limit
diversity jurisdiction). But see Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States Be Preserved?, 18
A. B. A. J. 499 (1932) ; Newlin, Proposed Limitations uipon Our Federal
Courts, 15 A. B. A. J. 401, 403 (1929) ; Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction

and Recent Attacts upon. It, 18 A. B. A. 3. 433 (1932). See also Yntema and
Jaffin, PreliminaryAnalysis of ConcurrentJvrisdiction, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev.

869 (1931).

124. See Frank, HistoricalBases of the Federal JudicialSystem, 23 Ind.
L. J. 236, 262-270 (1948).
125. See suprapp. 52-54.

